From the start, the Book Three of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding1, entitled "Of Words“, dedicated to language philosophy, has generally been assumed to be weak and, on any case, uninteresting part of Essay. Though, this Book of Essay wasn‘t influential and it was often controversial, in a certain way - it was original. For the first time, on the contrary to the Scholastic and Renaissance heritage, in which language research was mostly associated with logic and grammar, Locke announced a brand new epistemological orientation of language philosophy. Locke made a serious attempt to demonstrate relations among ideas, signs that we use for ideas and objects those ideas are related to.

It is a distinct question of significance and value of this conception of language when it‘s approached from contemporary language philosophy‘s point of view and I won‘t be dealing with that subject. It would be enough to highlight that some of the scholars (like J.L. Mackie in Problems from Locke) introduce the arguments in favour of claim that Locke anticipated one of contemporary theories (from 70‘s) of "ordinary use of language“ by Saul Kripke2, and Chomsky‘s innateness hypothesis3. On the other hand, we have commentators that are taking Locke "as a paradigm case of the private language philosopher, one who holds that our mental life consists of a succession of occult entities called "ideas“ to which reference is made whenever we utter words meaningfully“4.

The purpose of this paper is to give a general description of Locke‘s account of language. This paper has three main ideas. First one is to show how contemporary critics see Locke‘s theory, based on their conception of his term "signify“. Second, is to give short revision of most important moments and arguments of his semantic thesis. And, third, to present, often neglected, the social aspect of Locke‘s language theory.

The essence of Locke‘s theory is his statement that words are immediately representing ideas and not objects. This thesis is articulated on several places in Essay:
(1) "… Words… come to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas“5;
(2) "The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.“6;
(3) "Words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them“7,
(4) "That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker“8. "Being a sign of“, "being a mark of“ and "stand for“ are phrases that Locke didn‘t explain, but they are usually taken as synonyms for word "signify“9

What does "signify“ or "signification“ really mean in Locke‘s theory? The fact that Locke didn‘t precisely define them and that there could be observed several inconsistencies during thorough reading of Essay, didn‘t help at all. Depending on how commentators understand Locke‘s term "signify“ they base their criticism. There can be divided two main streams in contemporary critics of Locke‘s semantic theory:
(1) the ones that claim that "signify“ and "mean“ are, for Locke, equivalents and
(2) the ones that claim they are not.

First stream stands on a position that Locke took ideas to be literally the meanings of words10. However, they claim that, in his discussion about connexion between words and ideas, Locke overall doesn‘t perceive that, upon his definition, words are ideas. From Locke‘s statement that mind immediately perceives only his own ideas necessarily follows that every appearance of word is one idea, in Locke‘s sense, in mind of person that pronounces them, listens, reads or writes. Because, indices on paper (as we see them), sounds and sensations in organs, are ideas. It means that mind immediately perceives only its own ideas about words, so the situation is tangling, whereas now mind, signs for ideas, perceives by means of it‘s own ideas about those signs. In such a way we come to conclusion that the object we use for designating ideas is perceived only through ideas. As D.J. O‘Connor writes "he discusses theory of language which is complicating understanding of constitution of communication“11. But, is it a sense in which idea is sign for object, for example, the same as sense in which word is a sign of an idea? Locke is not explicitly investigating this question, but D.J. O‘Connor is presenting a plausible answer in spirit of Locke‘s thinking. First, words are signifying ideas "in random way totally imposing“; respectively, connexion between words and that something they are related to, is purely conventional. On the other side, connexion between ideas and that something they represent is part of nature and it is impossible to change it with a decision. Second, we are immediately acquainted with both, words and ideas; we immediately perceive ideas, and not the objects they are representing. Third, shape of representation is different in two cases. Ideas of primary qualities and images are on any case iconic; in fact similar to qualities they represent. Words, with couple exceptions (for example, onomatopoeia, like "boom“) are never iconic. Based on these tri submitted arguments O‘Connor concludes that "word "sign“ Locke uses in two very different senses. When he speaks of idea like sign, he uses term in one wide or metaphoric sense. When the word is functioning like a sign is a primary sense in which sign acts as substitution for that something it is signifying.“12 In this group of commentators we can also extricate standpoint made by E.J. Ashworth, who claimed that word "signify“, along with "sign“ and "signification“, is nothing but "quasy-technical terms for Locke“13, and argues by saying: "one of the standard uses of the word "meaning“ in Locke‘s day was as a synonym for "signification““ and that that "was just one of those philosophical commonplaces everyone, including Locke, took for granted“14.

The second stream15 tends to claim that Locke didn‘t even have a theory of meaning. I. Hacking is backing up that claim with statement that priority was given to mental discourse16 and that Locke‘s "signify“ did not mean "mean“17. Another author is Armstrong, who writes: "So if a Lockean type of analysis is to go through it must be accepted that what a certain utterance signifies in the sense stipulated, and what it means, are two different things.“18

The manner in which the word "signify“ is interpreted is very important, since interpretation of whole theory is in full changed as a consequence of diverse vision of that word. Nevertheless, hereafter I will try to bring forward foremost arguments that Locke used for arguing his theory.

The main thesis, as we previously mentioned, in most general formulation, is: words signify ideas. Since words are in fact articulated sounds that are imposed to represent designata, accordingly objects, qualities or relations that they signify, designata have to be that something we are immediately acquainted with. And the only immediate acknowledgements are our own ideas.

Words are signs for particular ideas, simple or complex, but Locke never claimed that all words signify ideas. For example, "ignorance“ and "barrenness“ "relate to positive ideas, and signify their absence“19. Besides "words which are names of ideas in the mind“20, people use words that are signs of connexion between ideas or propositions. The second "type“ of words Locke calls "particles“. Those words "are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas“21 but "they are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind“22. This chapter about particles is not crucial for Locke‘s account of words, but his attention to accentuate mental character of connexions and fact that they are product of mental activity of comparing ideas is obvious. Thereby recent interpreters of Locke‘s language theory suggest that clarification of symbolic functions of particles evolve in direction of saying that they can express mental propositions or activities or cross-reference to relations among ideas. For those reasons, perhaps it should be bared in mind that when Locke talks about the way that words signify ideas, he above the rest alludes on "names“.

Locke is arguing his main semantic thesis, whose "standard version“23 sounds: "Words in their primary and immediate signification signify nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them“24, with two arguments. First one is usually called "argument from use of language“25. Exposing the theory, Locke begins with observation that the language is necessary for communication among people. Language is, for Locke, "the great instrument and common tie to society“26. Therefore, in society is present constant demand for individuals to express their thoughts in most punctual possible way. "It was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others.“27 Those signs are, of course, words, and their primary use is -communication. But, Locke‘s idea is that words, in every use, signify the user‘s ideas, although the communicative use is primary and every other use derives from it. For example, the other use that Locke mentioned, is recording one‘s ideas and representing them to hearer, or recording them to be signs which will assist one‘s memory. Well, words, regardless on their particular use, "came to be made use of by men as signs of their ideas“28. With this argument, Locke affirmed thesis that: words signify ideas in the mind of him that uses them. But his goal was to insert in thesis also restrictive phrases "primary and immediate signification“ and "nothing but“. In order to do that, he needed second argument, for which contemporary scholars indicate that it is only a part (and the stronger part) of one integral argument29. This argument is based on Locke‘s doctrine of representative ideas, and goes: "nor can anyone apply them (words) as names, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath: for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time; and so in effect to have no signification at all.“30. What is that important conclusion that can be derived from this argument? Individual can use words to signify immediately only individual‘s own ideas. Therefore, person can use words in their primary and immediate signification to signify nothing but ideas in the mind of the person that uses them.

How are people communicating, with respect to words that are immediately signifying only ideas in the mind of person that uses them? If we say that the communication is acknowledgment of our own ideas to someone else, and that individual can‘t acknowledge his ideas "as they are“ or "immediately“ to another individual, how is communication unwinding? "A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own“31. After all, our words are, of course, related to indirectly both to ideas in other person's mind and to objects. It can be seen based on a fact that people who use the same language understand each other and fact that "men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but of things as really they are“32. Nevertheless, Locke insists that it‘s wrong utilization of words if we presume they correspond to anything but our own ideas. Still, "that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts; there comes, by constant use, to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses“33. Language, accordingly, is acting by exciting ideas to which he got used by associative connexions. When we determine that Locke‘s ideas predominantly consist of sensible elements it‘s not hard to observe imperfection of his account. Words are guiding to ideas. Ideas, on definition, mind can‘t acquire except if they are really present in him. Therefore, words can‘t occur unless if they are actually immanent in mind along with corresponding ideas. And in this way we return to beginning.

Now, though words are signs for our private ideas, although they are arbitrary and albeit there is no natural connexion and no similarity among words and ideas, with time-taking and habitual utilization of words it happens that they constantly and quickly provoke in man ideas that those words are representing. "It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly.“34 As J.W. Yolton remarks, in this way, individual is prisoner of its society, its thoughts and language. Power of descriptive, scientific language is in his power on occasion of describing and understanding of nature. Without satisfyingly wealthy and flexible language, science would be handicapped, or would be constrained to use diagrams and symbolic schemes. The same applies for language of moral, "whose power is not in his descriptive quality but in differences and standards it is disabling us to create“35.

So far, though as answer for question "how can words, as random signs of private ideas, be used for communication“, can be excepted that people acquiescence on same signs for the same ideas and that they are approving it, it is still not clear how is it possible that different people use the same word for the same idea. Certain ideas in mind A are sings of other certain ideas in mind A, and like wise is in mind B, C and so on. Locke, indeed, says "they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate“36. But, concerning Locke‘s theory, we don‘t have the right to presume that at all, because he doesn‘t give foundation to allow that one idea in mind A becomes "sign“ for idea in mind B. Our languages are private as our worlds are. Thence two men cannot have the same idea, they can, in the best case, have only more or less similar ideas. The fact that they are using the same word doesn‘t mean a thing, since words are arbitrary signs for ideas, wherefore one word can signify different ideas to different people. To ascertain whether those are the same ideas, we should those ideas immediately perceive and compare, and that is the thing that Locke‘s representative theory of knowledge in principle doesn‘t permit.

Every name has its corresponding idea; Locke claims that person is acquiring ideas before names and in line with that, some cognitions are prelinguistic. Locke admits "that in the beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the idea before one gave it the name“37, but now, born in society that already has language, children are often acquiring words before ideas with whom they should connect them. Priority of names upon ideas, according to Locke, often is situated in complex ideas of activities and peculiarities. "What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract ideas of glory and ambition, before he has heard the names of them?“38 In regard to moral notions, children are taught of their signification by annexing to it on the part of grownups, respectively connected to sounds, otherwise children are making conclusions by themselves based on perceived. Locke sees the danger in learning names before ideas œ danger of speaking "several words no otherwise than parrots do“39 œ but he adds that with attention while teaching that mistake can be avoided. Thereupon, learning language is important part of Locke‘s account of language. On one side, to make knowledge more precise and authentic, we must be sure that our ideas correspond to nature of objects, and then our language, which expresses that knowledge, must make level toward utilization in society, "common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation“40. On the other side, mistake of using words without ideas, namely "misuse of words the great cause of errors“41, is avoided with learning. How do we usually teach children meaning of words? "People ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that stands for it; as white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog.“42 Means, idea of one specific object becomes a sign (name) for that object, yet, word becomes a sign for idea of that specific object.

At the end of his discourse about language Locke is giving some practical advises for avoiding effects of natural imperfection of language. When we use words privately, for notation of our thoughts, key detail is that we should use them consequently, that is to say that every word should always stand for same idea. But language is mostly used for communication, so it‘s necessary to constitute a rule that idea signified by a certain word in mind A is identical to idea which is represented by the same word in mind B, who is communicating with mind A. Whereas the problem is impossible to solve in theory, in practice we should be satisfied with the fact that communication, namely understanding is occurring swimmingly and the actions of precaution are undertaken, so there won‘t be a chance to come to misapprehensions and mistakes.

Finally, Locke‘s account of language is faced with many problems. Some of them, Locke is solving within theory, some of them he tried to solve but didn‘t give satisfactory explanation, and some were ignored, no matter if he really didn‘t see them or avoided them on purpose. Whatever point of view we choose to deal with his language theory, whether we pay attention to it‘s public and social aspect, or we look at it as a part of epistemological theory or theory of meaning, we can come to conclusion that it was a great break through and that it gave us plenty material for thinking.43